This is an excellent book, full of careful research lightly worn. It is highly readable, provoking the intellectual and moral, as well as historical, imagination. Soldiers as well as doctors, specialist historians as well as non-academic readers, will surely read it: no mean accomplishment. It is neither military history, nor medical history, nor social history, but all of these. Ben Shephard writes without prejudgement of the great range of ways in which war damages minds, and ways in which people manage as well as fail to manage. That medicine must serve many masters is not news. But here we have a large-scale picture of what this means, often under the most emotive conditions, in the lives of participants of all kinds.
The book describes the presentation of nervous and mental disorders in war, and the medical response to them, under the headings of what at different times have been called "shell-shock", combat fatigue and post-traumatic stress disorder. The two great world wars-their aftermaths and domestic contexts as much as the actual fighting-dominate the book. All the same, the concluding chapters on the Vietnam War, the Gulf War and even the Falklands War significantly influence the book as a whole. Indeed, the book can be read as a profound reflection on the confusions, the swing from confident assertion to bewilderment, engendered by two decades of contemporary argument about posttraumatic stress disorder. The implication is that only the historical record will enable participants to see antagonistic positions in perspective. The book finds a repeated cycle of denial, exaggeration, understanding and forgetfulness about war-damaged minds. In part, this reflects the different interests at work, in very emotionally charged circumstances, from the senior officers battling for morale and fighting strength, the psychiatrists concerned for patients and professional ambition, the public wanting fighting but its sons kept whole, and bureaucracies contemplating huge long-term costs. The result, as this book clearly and authoritatively shows, is a kaleidoscope of shifting practice and opinion, conditions in which strong and charismatic individuals can and do make an impact, if only for a time.
Shephard has drawn on a marvellous variety of sources, especially from Britain but also from the United States, with an eye to what was happening elsewhere but without comparable detail. It is this patience and tenacity in conducting research on such a range of material, from studies of prisoners of war to domestic public opinion, from front-line trenches or tanks to innovations in group therapy, from problems of recruitment to problems of pensions, that makes the book stand out. Just how much some parties have had an interest in the story of human collapse not being told is especially pointed in a chapter on the allied bombing campaign over Germany. The half-familiar story of the significance to British psychology of "shellshock" receives full treatment, and the story reduces the role of psychoanalysis to its proper proportions.
The book brings home the ordinariness of suffering, weakness and collapse when people face not just actual violence but its prospect. It The value of Carpenter's work lies in the fact that it challenges the myth-making that often characterizes the historiography relating to the identification of the cause-and the prevention-of beriberi. Caused by a deficiency of thiamine (Vitamin B), the basis of beriberi had been the subject of much scientific speculation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, many, including Christiaan Eijkman (the Dutch physician assigned to work with a team investigating beriberi in Java in the late 1880s), often wondered whether it was an infection transmitted by a specific germ. A series of experiments by Eijkman, carried out on laboratory animals and selected human subjects, ultimately proved that the condition of beriberi was the result of specific dietary patterns, rather than infectious micro-organisms.
Strikingly 
